India has already transitioned to the low or negative growth stage
In the series of articles based on the latest projections of the population of different continents and countries of the world released by the United Nations in its World Population Prospects 2024, we have so far analysed the estimated and projected growth of population from 1950 to 2100 in the World and its Continents, in Africa and its regions, in Asia and its regions and in the five most populous countries of Asia, including India and her neighbours.
Before proceeding to present similar data for the remaining continents of the world, we are tempted to explore in some detail the demographic transition that the India has passed through since we achieved Independence in 1947. In this note, we present how the crude birth rate (CBR), crude death rate (CDR) and the population of India have progressed till now and their projected trajectory up to 2100.
The data indicates that the period of high growth in population is now behind us and India has already entered the fourth stage of demographic transition characterised by low and declining birth rate and death rate beginning to rise again from a very low level. In this phase the population is expected to grow very slowly, if at all. In another about 35 years, the total population is projected to begin declining.
This phase of demographic transition is also characterised by rapid aging of the population and quick depletion of the youth dividend that we have enjoyed so far as a result of the high growth that we experienced in the four decades after Independence. We shall describe the aging of Indian population in a subsequent note.
This phase of low growth is likely to further exacerbate the religious imbalance in the growth of population that has prevailed throughout the census period. To understand this growing imbalance, we need to improve the collection, publication and analysis of data on births and deaths in different parts of India. We have earlier described the greatly rising imbalance in the growth rates of different communities in Kerala, where reliable and continuous data on births and deaths happens to be available. We need similarly reliable and continuous data on births and deaths for other states and union territories, disaggregated according to religious communities, if we are to form a proper assessment of the imbalance in their growth in this phase of demographic transition. This needs urgent national attention.
The Demographic Transition of India
Crude Birth and Death Rates, 1950-2100
In Figure 1 below, we have drawn the progression of crude birth rate (CBR), crude death rate (CDR) and the population of India between 1950 and 2100. CBR and CDR are the total number of births and deaths, respectively, per thousand of population in a year. For this purpose, population is generally taken to be the number at mid-year. Therefore, in the figure here we have used population numbers as on July 1 of the year. In other articles in this series, we have been giving numbers for population as on January 1. As in the earlier notes in this series, the numbers for the CBR, CDR and population are taken from the “Compact Estimates and Medium Projection Table” of WPP 2024.[1]
From the Figure, it is apparent that the Indian population now, in 2025, is in the fourth stage of demographic transition, with birth rate reaching very low levels and death rate beginning to rise after touching its lowest level of 6.6 per thousand in 2025. The growth of population at this stage slows down and the numbers begin to stabilise. The population of India is projected to turn negative in the next three or four decades. This stage of demographic transition also implies an aging population with fewer and fewer people in the younger age-groups and rising numbers of older people of age 60 and above. We shall discuss this sharply changing age profile of Indian population in a subsequent note. In this article, we describe the various stages of demographic transition that we have passed through in the modern times.
In 1950, the point where the graphs in Figure 1 begin, the death and birth rates were already on a declining path. This corresponds to what is generally referred to the third stage of demographic transition. The first two stages of stable or declining population followed by a slow rise had happened before 1950, in the period of British Rule over India. We begin our narration from that phase and describe how India now has already completed almost the entire cycle of demographic transition and entered the stage of low, stagnating or negative growth.
The British Period: Stage 1 and 2
The period of alien British rule over India was not conducive to the growth of population here. With an unending series of famines, epidemics and wars, population of India remained static, declined or experienced only marginal growth during much of the British period. As seen in Table here, in the 150 years between 1800 and 1951, encompassing the whole period of stable British rule, the population of India (including Pakistan and Bangladesh) just about doubled, while that of the United Kingdom multiplied 5 times in the same period.
|
Population of Undivided India and United Kingdom (in million), 1801-1951 |
|||||||||||
|
1801 |
1871 |
1881 |
1891 |
1901 |
1911 |
1921 |
1931 |
1941 |
1943 |
1951 |
|
|
India |
~200 |
255 |
257 |
282 |
285 |
303 |
306 |
338 |
389 |
- |
446 |
|
UK |
10.5 |
31.5 |
34.9 |
37.8 |
41.5 |
44.9 |
43.9 |
46.1 |
44.9 |
48.3 |
50.3 |
|
Note: 1941 figure for UK excludes the population of the armed forces of UK, it is included in 1943. For the same reason, we have taken the figure for 1910 instead of 1911 for UK. |
|||||||||||
Between 1871 and 1921, Population of India barely grew. It rose from 255 million to 306 million in 50 years. In this period, every decade of significant growth was followed by a couple of decades of static population. Population of India began to grow consistently only after 1921. Between 1921 and 1951, it rose from 306 to 446 million, multiplying one and a half times in three decades, notwithstanding the large-scale deaths caused by World War II and the Great Bengal Famine of 1943. This was because of a steady decline in death rates after the devastation caused by the flu epidemic of 1918. Even so, the crude death rate at Independence was above 20 per thousand and infant mortality was extremely high at 180 deaths per 1,000 live births.
The period from 1850 to 1920, thus can be taken as the first stage of demographic transition in India, when the birth and death rates were very high and population remained nearly stable. The period from 1920 to 1950 forms the second stage of the transition when the death rates began to decline, but birth rates remained high.
1950-1985: Early Stage 3
Slow decline of CDR and CBR
The graphs of CDR and CBR in Figure 1 begin at 1950, soon after Independence. Death rate in India then, according to the WPP data that we are working with, was still high at 22.7 per thousand persons. In the preceding three decades, it had declined to that level from about 45 deaths per thousand during 1911-1921. Since 1950, the death rate has been declining continuously, except for the two blips of 1965-1967 and 2020-2021 when it registered sudden but brief rises, which we discuss later in this note. Except for these two anomalies, the decline has been steady until now, up to 2025.
Unlike in the pre-Independence period, when the birth rate was rising, CBR also began declining soon after 1950. The rate was 44.1 births per thousand in 1950. For the next three years, it rose slightly to reach 44.6 in 1954. After that it began a steady decline, which is continuing till now. Birth rate in 2025 is estimated at 15.8 per thousand.
The decline in death and birth rates, though steady and continuous, has been slow, at least in the early decades following 1950. In the 35 years between 1950 and 1985, birth rate in India declined from 44.1 in 1950 to 35.4 in 1985 and the death rate declined from 22.7 to 12.2 per thousand. The birth rate in China in these 35 years declined much more sharply, from 41.0 in 1950 to 22.8 in 1985. More significantly, death rate there declined drastically from 23.1 in 1950 to as low as 7.1 in 1985. This relative slowness of the decline of CBR and CDR, especially the latter, in India compared to our peer countries, is a significant feature characterising the growth of population in India. In our next note, we present comparative progression of fertility and mortality in India and some of our peer countries.
This phase, when both birth and death rates of a population are declining, is referred to as the third stage of demographic transition. In the early part of this phase, populations grow quite rapidly because the gap between the birth and death rates remains wide notwithstanding the declining birth rate. In the 35 years of this phase, Indian population more than doubled, with the estimated mid-year population rising from 346 million in 1950 to 773 million in 1985.
1985-2025: Late Stage 3
After 1985, the decline in CBR became faster, while the CDR continued its slow decline. The gap between births and deaths kept becoming narrower. As a consequence, the rate of growth of population started stabilising and then falling. But the population still kept growing. In these forty years, the population of India fell short of doubling, rising from the mid-year population of 773 million in 1985 to 1,464 million in 2025.
2025 onwards: Stage 4
Now in 2025, we have entered State 4 of the demographic transition, with nearly stable or slowly growing population. Crude Birth Rate has now declined to around 15 per thousand and Crude Death Rate to about 7 percent. From now onwards, CDR is projected to begin rising, indicating significant aging of population, while CBR shall keep declining, leading to shrinking of the younger cohorts.
In the next 35 years, the Indian population is projected to increase by only 237 million persons to reach 1,701 million in 2060. Soon after that, from 2064 onwards, the population shall begin declining. As we can see in Figure 1, at that point, total number of deaths shall surpass total number of births in a year.
When countries enter this stage of demographic transition, the populations begin aging rapidly and the youth dividend acquired during the expanding phase begins depleting. Median Age of Indian population has been rising since 1985 and the rise is projected to become much faster after 2025. We describe this aging of Indian population in a subsequent note.
Demographic Transition in Absolute Numbers
To better understand the demographic transition that India has passed through since 1950, we have drawn, in Figure 2, the absolute number of births and deaths that have taken place and are projected to happen between 1950 and 2100. The Figure also gives the annual natural accretion, total births minus total deaths in a year, in this period.
Number of Births
The different stages of transition are more clearly discernible in this Figure. As can be seen, the crude number of births began rising rapidly immediately after 1950. It rose from 15 million to 27 million in 1985. After that, the number of births plateaued and remained stable between 27 and 29 million up to 2000. From 2000 onwards, the number of births began declining sharply to reach around 23 million in 2025. From this point, the decline in the number of births has become slower, but the downward trend is projected to continue steadily up to the end of the century.
Number of Deaths
The absolute number of deaths rose slowly from 7.8 million in 1950 to 9.5 million in 1975 (ignoring the blip of 1965-1967), and then nearly plateaued, declining very slowly to about 9 million in 2014. At that stage the number of deaths began rising, slowly in the beginning, but the rise has become considerably sharper after 2025 (ignoring again the blip of 2020-21). Incidentally, it may be noted that though the absolute number of deaths between 1975 and 2014 remained nearly unchanged, the number of deaths per thousand of population, the crude death rate declined, as seen in Figure 1, because of the rising population. The decline in the CDR continues up to 2025, when both the absolute number of deaths as also the CDR begins rising.
Natural Accretion
From 1950 up to 1985, the number of births was rising sharply while the number of deaths rose much more slowly. This led to a sharp rise in natural accretion from less than 8 million annually in 1950 to nearly 18 million in 1985. From then to around 2000, the number of births stabilised between 27 to 29 million, while the number of deaths remained almost unchanged at 9 to 9.5 million. Natural accretion in this period increased very slowly from about 18 to 20 million. After that, the number of births began falling sharply and so did the net natural accretion to population. Now, from 2025 onwards, the number of deaths has started rising, while the number of births is projected to keep falling further. The natural accretion to population in this period is expected to be slow. The process would culminate in the number of deaths overtaking births in 2062, and natural accretion turning negative.
The high deaths of 1965-67 and 2020-21
Before further describing the demographic evolution that India has gone through in this period, let us discuss the two blips, the two sharp and brief increases, in deaths that are seen in both the CDR in Figure 1 and in the absolute number of deaths in Figure 2. These blips correspond to two very significant events in our history of the last 75 years.
The Food Crisis of 1965-1967
|
Crisis of 1965-67 Deaths in thousands |
|
|
Year |
Deaths |
|
1964 |
8,871 |
|
1965 |
9,489 |
|
1966 |
9,543 |
|
1967 |
9,610 |
|
1968 |
9,155 |
During 1965-67, India passed through a scarcity of food that was serious enough to keep the death rates elevated for three years. Number of deaths was below 9 million in 1964. For the next three years, it remained about or above 9.5 million before reverting to around 9 million in 1968. The crisis began with the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965. This was followed by the severe drought and famine that occurred in Bihar and Eastern Uttar Pradesh during 1966-1967. That calamity is known to have led to numerous starvation deaths. Food situation in that period had become difficult all over India. Many still remember and perhaps continue to observe the discipline of skipping one meal a week that was widely adopted on the call of the then Prime Minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri. Many would also remember the American shipments of wheat under PL-480 that had become a crucial source for sustaining supply of food in the country and gave rise to commentators invoking the sad imagery of “ship to mouth existence”.
The mid-sixties were a period of food-stress for much of the poorer world. The situation was so bad that two American scholars, William and Paul Paddock, wrote a book postulating that the poor of the world could be saved only by the food donated by the United States of America.[3] But America did not have enough save all of the hungry countries and had to decide which one should be saved and which had to be left to die. India and Egypt, according to them, were among the countries that had to be necessarily abandoned. This was in 1967. The next year, an American biologist, Paul R. Ehrlich, wrote another book titled, The Population Bomb,[4] endorsing and praising the work of the Paddock brothers and making similar predictions about a looming Malthusian catastrophe.
These dire predictions did not come true. In India, the crisis of 1965-1967 led to the adoption of policies that facilitated the Green Revolution, almost immediately eliminating the need for any large scale import of food.[5] The persistent talk of India, and much of the poorer world, being grossly overpopulated and the need to control a “population explosion” can be largely traced to the alarmist predictions arising from that crisis of mid-sixties. In hindsight, the growth in the population of India and of much of the so-called Third World has proved to be a great asset. It is this rise in population has helped the poor nations acquire a much larger share and say in economy and geo-politics of the world.
The Covid Epidemic of 2020-21
|
Covid 2020-21 Deaths in thousands |
|
|
Year |
Deaths |
|
2019 |
9,264 |
|
2020 |
10,118 |
|
2021 |
13,094 |
|
2022 |
9,373 |
During this more recent episode of raised CDR, India, along with the rest of the world, had to face the extraordinary virulent and lethal Covid Epidemic. In this period, the number of deaths in India, as in almost all countries of the world, rose significantly. As seen in the Table here, the number of annual deaths in India rose from about 9 million in 2019 to 10 million in 2020 and to as high as 13 million in 2021 before falling back to the normal figure of about 9 million in 2022. The excess death due to Covid in these WPP estimates turns out to be very high, of the order of nearly 5 million. This number is in line with the WHO estimate of about 4.74 million excess deaths in India due to COVID, but is much higher than the estimates of the official Indian agencies. However, the latest report of the Civil Registration System, released in 2025 and incorporating data up to 2021, does show a much higher mortality related to Covid than the earlier official estimates.
Conclusion: Consequences of the Demographic Transition
Reverting to the description of the demographic transition, the data graphically depicted in Figure 1 and 2 shows that India has completed the phase of growth and has already transitioned to the phase of low growth of population. The period of high growth of population that has been a matter of great public concern since the sixties is now behind us. The new phase of demographic progression that we have entered now raises new issues and policy responses. The most significant of these are:
1. Imbalances in Growth: With the population progressing to the low-birth stage, the total fertility rate (TFR) of India as a whole has fallen below the replacement-level of 2.1. However, there is a considerable differential in the TFR of different states, of different socio-economic groups and of different religious communities. This is likely to give rise to great imbalance between regions, groups and communities requiring appropriate policy response. But, we just do not seem to have the data to properly estimate and quantify these differences. The next census would give us some information of the differential fertility of different regions, groups and communities for a particular year. To get continuous information on these aspects we need to vastly improve our civil registration system so that every birth and death is properly logged and detailed information about the changing fertility and mortality patterns becomes available more or less in real time. Kerala does keeps a fairly reliable record of its vital statistics and publishes the data regularly. We have analysed this data in one of our notes on the changing religious demography of India. The data indeed shows rising religious imbalance in the growth of population in the low fertility regime that prevails across all communities in that state.[6] This analysis for Kerala illustrates the crucial importance of having good, reliable and continuous record of births and deaths in every part of India.
2. Aging of the population: The transition implies aging of population, increase in the number of elderly and decline in the numbers of economically active youth. The youth dividend that we have been enjoying for the last 2 to 3 decades is probably behind us. We shall describe the pattern of the aging of Indian population in a subsequent article, where we shall also refer to the consequences of such aging.
Before describing the progression of aging in India, we shall, in the next article, explore a little further the characteristics of the transition that we have passed through and compare our experience with some of our peer countries.
Appendix:
In the Table below, we give an abstract of the data we have used in Figures 1 and 2. We give the estimated and projected numbers for every fifth year. For drawing the figures, annual numbers have been used.
|
Abstract Table of data on Fertility and Mortality, 1950-2100 |
||||||
|
Year |
TFR |
CBR |
CDR |
Births |
Deaths |
B-D |
|
1950 |
5.7 |
44.1 |
22.7 |
15,288 |
7,852 |
7,436 |
|
1955 |
5.9 |
44.4 |
21.1 |
17,220 |
8,169 |
9,051 |
|
1960 |
5.9 |
42.9 |
19.4 |
18,705 |
8,467 |
10,238 |
|
1965 |
5.9 |
41.7 |
19.4 |
20,414 |
9,489 |
10,926 |
|
1970 |
5.6 |
39.8 |
17.0 |
21,705 |
9,287 |
12,418 |
|
1975 |
5.2 |
38.4 |
15.5 |
23,451 |
9,493 |
13,958 |
|
1980 |
4.8 |
37.1 |
13.8 |
25,471 |
9,453 |
16,018 |
|
1985 |
4.4 |
35.4 |
12.2 |
27,367 |
9,399 |
17,968 |
|
1990 |
4.0 |
32.6 |
10.7 |
28,172 |
9,278 |
18,894 |
|
1995 |
3.7 |
29.8 |
9.6 |
28,588 |
9,192 |
19,396 |
|
2000 |
3.4 |
27.5 |
8.6 |
29,112 |
9,127 |
19,984 |
|
2005 |
3.0 |
24.3 |
7.8 |
28,063 |
9,028 |
19,035 |
|
2010 |
2.6 |
21.6 |
7.2 |
26,901 |
8,909 |
17,992 |
|
2015 |
2.3 |
18.9 |
6.7 |
25,147 |
8,936 |
16,211 |
|
2020 |
2.0 |
16.7 |
7.2 |
23,485 |
10,118 |
13,367 |
|
2025 |
1.9 |
15.8 |
6.6 |
23,073 |
9,717 |
13,356 |
|
2030 |
1.9 |
14.8 |
6.9 |
22,551 |
10,596 |
11,954 |
|
2035 |
1.8 |
13.8 |
7.3 |
21,759 |
11,566 |
10,193 |
|
2040 |
1.8 |
12.8 |
7.8 |
20,759 |
12,613 |
8,146 |
|
2045 |
1.8 |
11.9 |
8.3 |
19,750 |
13,703 |
6,047 |
|
2050 |
1.8 |
11.3 |
8.8 |
18,962 |
14,785 |
4,177 |
|
2055 |
1.7 |
10.8 |
9.4 |
18,345 |
15,872 |
2,473 |
|
2060 |
1.7 |
10.5 |
10.0 |
17,822 |
16,939 |
883 |
|
2065 |
1.7 |
10.1 |
10.6 |
17,210 |
18,003 |
-793 |
|
2070 |
1.7 |
9.8 |
11.3 |
16,498 |
19,004 |
-2,506 |
|
2075 |
1.7 |
9.5 |
11.9 |
15,795 |
19,856 |
-4,061 |
|
2080 |
1.7 |
9.2 |
12.5 |
15,183 |
20,495 |
-5,311 |
|
2085 |
1.7 |
9.1 |
12.9 |
14,649 |
20,894 |
-6,245 |
|
2090 |
1.7 |
9.0 |
13.3 |
14,200 |
21,057 |
-6,857 |
|
2095 |
1.7 |
8.9 |
13.5 |
13,676 |
20,909 |
-7,233 |
|
2100 |
1.7 |
8.7 |
13.6 |
13,155 |
20,545 |
-7,390 |
|
Note: Data for every fifth year. Numbers in last 3 columns are in thousands. |
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[1] World Population Prospects 2024, Compact Estimates and Medium Projection
Table, available at:
https://population.un.org/wpp/assets/Excel%20Files/1_Indicator%20(Standard)/EXCEL_FILES/1_General/WPP2024_GEN_F01_DEMOGRAPHIC_INDICATORS_COMPACT.xlsx
[2] In this Table India includes Pakistan and Bangladesh. Figure for India in 1801 is an
approximation based on various estimates of the population of Mughal Empire.
Figures from 1871 to 1941 are estimates of Kingsley Davis quoted from Joshi, et
al, Religious Demography of India, Centre for Policy Studies, 2003. The
figure for 1951 is from the same book and is calculated from the Censuses of
India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. The figures for United Kingdom are estimates of
the Office of National Statistics of UK available at:
https://www.ons.gov.uk/file?uri=/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/populationestimates/adhocs/004356ukpopulationestimates1851to2014/ukpopulationestimates18512014.xls
[3] Paul and William Paddock, Famine 1975! America's Decision: Who Will Survive?, Little Brown and Company, USA, 1967.
[4] Paul R. Ehrlich, The Population Bomb, Ballantine Books, USA, 1968.
[5] Green Revolution was designed to ensure eliminate the need to import food, not to ensure abundance and sufficiency of food for all of the people and animals in India. For an analysis of this and other issues related to the Green Revolution, see: https://cpsindia.org/articles/e-science-and-technology-in-independent-india/2-green-revolution-a-historical-perspective/
[6] Rising religious imbalance in the declining fertility regime of Kerala.
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