Delimitation in the midst of demographic transition

 

While looking at the long-term population trends of Uttar Pradesh and its Districts, in the process of preparing a resource atlas of Sambhal District, I was surprised to notice that the share of Uttar Pradesh in the population of India had been declining sharply and continuously from 1901 up to 1971. On further exploration, I learnt that the share of Bihar had continued to decline up to 1991, though the decline was not quite as sharp as in UP. On the other hand, the share of Kerala had been rising up to 1971 before beginning to sharply decline. Many other States which are witnessing  decline in their share had a stable or rising share till recently.

 

The data implies that any delimitation based on recent numbers shall readjust representation for recent trends without taking into account long-term progression of population in different States. The long-term trends of population growth suggest that most of the States, including those who have experienced the greatest rise in shares, are likely to complete the cycle of demographic transition that began in the last century in the next three or four decades. That would be a more appropriate stage for carrying out a delimitation exercise. Such delimitation would reflect a more permanent state of demographic balance amongst different States.

 

In this note, we present the changing shares of major States of India from 1901-2011. We also give estimates of the number of seats in the Lok Sabha that different States would get if we were to use their populations at different points in this period of great demographic change. In a subsequent note, we give trends of changes in decadal growth for all major States. 

 

All this needs to be considered to make an appropriate decision about delimitation. The data clearly suggests that it would be wise to wait for another three or four decades, as we have done since 1976, for the current phase of demographic progression to be completed.

 

 

Population-share of major States, estimated representation 
and long-term population trends

 

 

1.    Population-share of major States

 

In Table 1, we give the share of major States in the population of India from 1901 to 2011. Census of India retroactively recalculates and adjusts historical population numbers of earlier Censuses based on the updated jurisdictional boundaries. The Table here is based on such recalculated numbers in Table A-2 of Census 2011. Below, we discuss the pattern of change in share in some detail, while grouping the States in distinct geographical regions:

 

 

States of the Ganga-Brahmaputra Plains

 

Uttar Pradesh

 

As seen in Table 1, Uttar Pradesh holds by far the largest share in the population of India. Even after the separation of Uttarakhand, Uttar Pradesh forms one-sixth of India in terms of population. In terms of area, it is only about one-fourteenth. Density of population in the State at 829 persons per square kilometre is two and a half times the average of India at 382.

 

The share of the State in 1901was nearly one-fifth, 19.57 percent to be exact. Between 1901 and 1911, the share declined by nearly 1.75 percentage points to 18.25 percent. The beginning of the twentieth century, and perhaps much of the nineteenth, was a difficult period for India and, especially for the State of Uttar Pradesh. In 1901-1911, the first decade of the century, the population of India grew by just 5.75 percent and that of Uttar Pradesh declined by 1.36 percent. The State then, like many parts of the country, was suffering from epidemics of malaria and bubonic plague, there was generalised scarcity of food and almost complete absence of clean drinking water, hygiene and basic health facilities. 

 

The second decade of the twentieth century was worse than the first. During that decade, the epidemics, scarcity and lack of hygiene and health continued to persist, but were made worse by the large-scale recruitment of young men to serve the war-machine of the British as soldiers and labourers across the world and by repeated visitations of the deadly Spanish Flu during 1918. In that decade, the population of India as a whole suffered a decline of 0.31 percent. Population of the State fared much worse, it declined by 3.16 percent. Since, the State in that decade, unlike the previous decade of 1901-11, shared the decline with the whole country, its share in India declined by a relatively moderate half a percentage point.

 

After 1921, the population of India as a whole began to rise with some improvement in nutrition, hygiene and health. That year is considered the dividing line that launched India into a phase of continuous demographic growth. That phase is coming to an end now after nearly a century. But while much of the rest of the country began to improve, the conditions in Uttar Pradesh remained relatively poor, leading to its share in population continuing to decline up to 1971, when it reached 15.60, fully 4 percentage points below its share in 1901. Improvement in the share of Uttar Pradesh has occurred only during the last four decades. It has reached 16.50 in 2011, which is still 3 percentage points below its value in 1901.

 

The demographic story of Uttar Pradesh is the story of the impact of British colonisation of India at its worst. It took Uttar Pradesh, and many other parts of India, almost 3 decades after Independence to fully overcome the deleterious impact of that alien rule.

 

 

Bihar

 

Bihar, as constituted today (excluding Jharkhand) formed the second largest State by its share in the population of India in 1901. It formed 8.91 percent of India then. As the State, like Uttar Pradesh, began to suffer a continuous decline in its share from then onwards, its second position was taken over by Maharashtra in 1931. The share of Bihar continued to decline further— though more slowly than that of Uttar Pradesh— up to 1991, when it reached 7.62 percent.

 

In the two decades since then, the share of the State has risen by one percentage point to 8.60 percent which is still below 8.91 percent of 1901. Any fresh delimitation shall raise the representation of the State for the increase that has happened during these two decades.

 

 

Jharkhand

 

Though the share of Bihar has seen significant changes, that of Jharkhand, which was part of Bihar until recently but geographically lies largely outside the Ganga plains, on the Chhota Nagpur plateau, has remained almost unchanged. Between 1901 and 2011, its share in India has fluctuated in a narrow range between 2.6 and 2.8 percent. Delimitation now would probably not change anything for the State except for some rounding up or down.

 

 

West Bengal

 

The share of West Bengal remained remarkably stable between 7.0 and 7.3 percent in the entire pre-Independence period, except for a decline to slightly below 7 percent in 1921 and 1931. In the first decade after Independence, during 1951-1961, the share of the State rose significantly to reach around 8 percent. It remained nearly unchanged at that figure up to 1991. In the last two decades, however, the State has seen a decline in its share to 7.54 percent. Any delimitation at this stage shall be in the nature of a penalty for the decline of these two decades.

 

 

Assam

 

Assam had a very different experience than other States. The share of Assam in the population of India kept rising continuously throughout the British period and the rise persisted up to 1971. The share of the State was 1.35 percent in 1901, it doubled to 2.67 percent in 1971. This rise was a consequence of a systematic effort by the British to settle peasantry from several districts of what is now Bangladesh in the fertile plains of lower Assam. The effort continued through the entire British period and continued informally or illegally for some decades after Partition. The share of Assam in the population of India stabilised only after 1971. In 1971, 1981 and 1991 its share remained around 2.67 percent. In the last two decades, the share of the State has declined marginally to 2.58 percent. The decline is not significant enough to have any effect on Assam’s share in parliamentary representation in the case of a fresh delimitation.

 

 

Northern States

 

Rajasthan

 

Through the British period, the share of Rajasthan remained remarkably stable between 4.3 and 4.4, except for a decline to 4.1 in 1921 and 4.2 in 1931. This decline was related to the relatively intense impact of the disastrous decade of 1911-21 marked by the war and the great Spanish flu. At the end of the British period, Rajasthan had a share of 4.42 compared to 4.32 at the beginning of the twentieth century.

 

After Independence, however, the share of Rajasthan has risen continuously from decade to decade. It reached 4.70 in 1971 and has further risen to 5.66 now in 2011. Rajasthan is one of the States that shall gain substantially from any delimitation with the currently available data.

 

 

Haryana

 

Haryana, as constituted today, had a share of 1.94 percent in the population of India in 1901. The State suffered a great decline in 1901-1911, because the impact of the third wave of the Bubonic Plague that swept through India in early 1900s was the worst in the then Punjab that included Haryana. The southern districts of Punjab, which form Haryana now, also suffered from drought and famines. The share of Haryana in that decade fell from 1.94 to 1.66 percent.

 

For the next three decades, the share of the State remained nearly stable at around 1.65 percent. The decade of 1941-51 saw a dip from 1.65 to 1.57 percent associated largely with the massive movement of populations caused by the Partition.

 

From 1951 onwards, the share of Haryana in the population of India, like that of Rajasthan, has been rising continuously. It reached 1.83 percent in 1971 and 2.09 percent in 2011. This is another State that shall gain from a fresh delimitation with the currently available data.

 

 

Punjab

 

The pre-Independence demographic experience of Punjab is similar to that of Haryana. In the first decade of the twentieth century, the share of Punjab in the population of India fell sharply from 3.16 to 2.67 percent, for reasons that we have described earlier— visitation of the third wave of Plague, the continuing epidemics of malaria and famines and drought in several parts. 

 

For the next three decades, the share of Punjab improved slowly to reach 3.01 percent in 1941. But the 1941-51 decade of War and Partition saw a much larger decline in Punjab than in Haryana. The share of Punjab in the population of India in 1951 was 2.54 percent.

 

From 1951 onwards, the share of Punjab, unlike that of Haryana, has been continuously declining. It reached 2.47 percent in 1971 and to 2.29 percent in 2011. The decline has been particularly sharp during the last two decades. Punjab, therefore, is one of the States that will lose in any delimitation exercise based on the current data.

 

The other three northern States— Jammu and Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand—

are demographically small hilly States. Their parliamentary representation is not decided on the basis of share in population alone. However, as seen in the Table, Uttarakhand’s share has been remarkably stable between 0.82 to 0.85 percent in the whole of this period. It didn’t see a decline even in the first two difficult decades of the last century. Himachal Pradesh has followed the pattern of Punjab with its share in the population declining sharply during 1901-11 and again in 1941-51, followed by a continuous decline between 1951 and 2011. The share of Himachal Pradesh in 2011 is 0.57 percent compared to 0.63 percent in 1971 and 0.81 percent in 1901. Jammu and Kashmir had a share of 0.90 percent in 1901, it rose to 0.96 percent in 1911 and 1921, fell back to 0.90 percent in 1951. It suffered a further decline to 0.81 percent in 1961. Since then, the share of the State has been rising. It reached 0.84 percent in 1971 and is 1.04 percent in 2011.

 

 

Central and Western States

 

Madhya Pradesh

 

Madhya Pradesh, like other States of this region had a very different demographic experience than the States of the Ganga plains and even the northern States. During 1901-1911, the share of Madhya Pradesh went up from 5.32 to 5.65 percent as many other States suffered a decline. Over the next three decades, the share of Madhya Pradesh declined slowly to 5.39 in 1941 and had a somewhat sharper decline in the next decade to reach 5.16 percent in 1951. Since then, the share of the State has been continuously rising. It reached 5.48 percent in 1971 and is 6.00 percent in 2011. Madhya Pradesh is among the States that is likely to gain substantially in a delimitation carried out on the basis of the current populations.

 

 

Chhattisgarh

 

Chhattisgarh, which was part of Madhya Pradesh until 2000, also experienced a substantial rise in its share from 1.75 to 2.06 percent during 1901-11. Since then, its share has remained remarkably stable, fluctuating in the narrow range of 2.03 to 2.16 percent. The State is unlikely to be impacted one way or the other by a delimitation exercise.

 

 

Maharashtra

 

Maharashtra, like Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh, experienced a substantial rise in its share in the population of India in the first decade of the twentieth century. It rose from 8.13 percent in 1901 to 8.52 percent in 1911. The share fell to 8.30 percent in the next decade, rose to 8.59 in 1931 and again fell to 8.40 percent in 1941. In the next decade of War and Partition, the State recorded a considerable gain, with its share rising to 8.86 percent in 1951. This was because of a considerable influx of the migrants from Pakistan to the State and particularly to the city of Mumbai after Partition.

 

After 1951, the share of Maharashtra has grown slowly up to 2001. But it has declined slightly during 2000-2011. This may be an indication of a long-term trend of declining growth. Its share in 1971 was 9.20 percent in 1971 and is nearly the same at 9.28 percent in 2011.

 

 

Gujarat

 

Gujarat is perhaps the only State whose share in the population of India has kept growing consistently since 1901. The only decline occurred in 1981-91, when the share of the State fell from 4.99 to 4.88. In has risen again to 4.99 in 2011. The share of Gujarat was 3.81 percent in 1901, 4.50 in 1951, 4.99 in 1971 and the same 4.99 in 2011.

 

 

Southern States

 

Odisha

 

Odisha is usually counted among the eastern States. We are counting it among the Southern States, because it has suffered a considerable decline in its share of the population of India, a trend that is similar to the Southern States.

 

Odisha had a share of 4.32 percent in 1901. It rose to 4.51 percent in 1911, when the share of many other States was declining. It fell marginally to 4.44 percent in 1921 and rose to 4.48 in 1931. After that, the share of the State has been continuously declining. It was 4.00 percent in 1961 and 1971 and is 3.47 percent in 2011. This decline puts Odisha among the States that are likely to lose the most in the case of a fresh delimitation on the basis of current data.

 

 

Andhra Pradesh (including Telangana)

 

The share of Andhra Pradesh, that has Odisha on its north, also rose considerable in the first decade, from 8.00 percent in 1901 to 8.51 percent in 1911. For the next four decades it hovered around 8.60. The share was 8.62 percent in 1951. Since Independence, the share of the State has been declining consistently and has reached 6.99 percent in 2011 compared to 7.94 in 1971, which forms the basis of the currently existing delimitation. The share of the State had remained nearly stable only during 1981-91. Since 1991, the decline has been sharper.

 

Andhra Pradesh, along with other Southern States, is likely to lose considerably if a fresh delimitation is done on the basis of the numbers of the latest Census.

 

 

Karnataka

 

The share of Karnataka has remained relatively stable up to the recent decades. Its share was 5.48 in 1901. It declined slowly to 5.10 in 1941, rose to 5.37 in 1951 and remained near that number up to 1971. There was a further rise to 5.43 in 1981. For the next three decades, the share of the State has been declining sharply compared to its earlier experience and has reached 5.10 percent in 2011. This decline of recent decades is likely to result in some loss for Karnataka if a fresh delimitation is done on the basis of the data of 2011.

 

 

Kerala

 

Unlike most other States, the share of Kerala in the population of India kept rising consistently from 1901 to 1971. Its share was 2.68 percent in 1901 and reached 3.89 percent in 1971. Since then, it has been rapidly declining and has reached 2.76 percent in 2011, which is very near its share of 2.68 percent in 1901. The deline since 1971 has negatived the gains of 1901 to 1971.

 

It seems that Kerala began its cycle of population growth and decline early and has already completed its demographic transition to reach a stage where its population shall soon be entering the phase of contraction. Kerala shall lose the most in its relative representation in the case of a fresh delimitation based on the latest data of 2011.

 

 

Tamil Nadu

 

Contrary to almost all other States, Tamil Nadu experienced a considerable rise in its share in both 1901-11 and 1911-21. At least one of these two decades had proved disastrous for other States. In these two decades, its share rose from 8.08 to 8.61 percent, making it the second largest State by population in 1921, after only Uttar Pradesh.

 

After 1921, the share of the State has continuously declined, except for a trivially small rise in 1951. The decline has been particularly sharp after 1971, though the 2011 numbers indicate some moderation of the declining trend.

 

The share of the State was 7.52 in 1971 and is 5.96 percent in 2011. The State is likely to lose the most in its absolute number of Lok Sabha seats in case of fresh delimitation.

 

 

 

2.    Estimation of Lok Sabha Seats for different States 

 

Based on the shares of major States in the population of India, we now proceed to estimate the number of Lok Sabha seats likely to be allocated to each State if we follow the same methodology that the Third Delimitation Commission, which submitted its report in 1976,  had followed, but use the population figures of Census of 2011 instead of 1971 that was used by that Commission. For comparison, we also estimate the seats accruing to different States, if the same methodology were applied while using the population of 1951 or 1901. Before giving our estimates, we first describe the methodology adopted by the Third Commission (1970-76).

 

 

Methodology

 

The Commission began by calculating a “National Population Quotient” to arrive at the number of persons per allocable Lok Sabha Seat. For working out this quotient, the Commission adopted the following methodology:

 

Exclusions

 

Before working out the quotient, the Commission made the following allocations of seats for the Union Territories, the Small States and the Major States:

1. Union Territories: The Commission allocated 13 seats to the 7 Union Territories of that time. Table 3 lists these 7 UTs along with the number of seats allocated to these. These 13 seats were assigned from a separate “UTs Pool” created by the Parliament. This pool was capped at 20 in 1976. The seats in this pool were not subject to any consideration of population. As seen in Table 2, the Commission assigned 7 seats to the National Capital Territory of Delhi. If the Commission had used the same population quotient that it ultimately used for the major States, Delhi would have got only 3 seats. It assigned one seat each to the remaining 6 UTs. By the criterion of population, these 6 would have got just one seat between them.

 

2. Small States: The Commission allocated another 12 seats to seven small States. These States had been granted a fixed number of seats in the statutes through which these were created. The Commission did not have the power to change that number. The list of these 7 states and the number of seats allotted to each of these in given in Table 2. These seats were allocated from the States quota of Seats, which was constitutionally capped at a maximum of 525 at that time. 

 

3. Major States: The Commission decided to allocate 517 Seats for the remaining 20 Major States, whose seats were to be decided proportionately to their population. This exceeded the then constitutional cap of 525 seats for the States, established by the 81st Amendment, but remained within the overall cap of 545 seats for the Lok Sabha.

 

4. Additional Seats for Some States: Out of the 517 seats for the States, the Commission further set aside 3 seats to be assigned to the hill states beyond their entitlement on the basis of population. Of these, 2 were allocated to Jammu & Kashmir and 1 to Himachal Pradesh.

 

Calculating the National Quotient

 

After allocating 13 seats for the UTs, 12 for the smaller States that had statutorily determined seats and setting aside 3 additional seats for the hill states of J&K and Himachal Pradesh, the Commission was left with 514 seats to be assigned to the 20 major States in proportion to their population as counted in Census 1971. To arrive at the quotient to be applied for these States, the Commission subtracted the population of the 7 UTs and 7 States, for which it had already made the allocation of seats, from the total population of India counted in 1971 and divided the remainder by 514 as below:

 

 

Following its logic, the Commission would have arrived at a national quotient of 10,44,979 persons per seat for the 514 allocable seats available with it. The Commission rounded it up to arrive at a neat national quotient of 10,44,000. This rounding up means that the population of India after subtracting the population of the UTs and the exempted States was divided by not 514 but by a number between 514 and 515, nearer 514.8, to arrive at the national quotient. 

 

In Table 3 below, we give the number of seats calculated by this formula for each of the 20 States. Column “Actual (1971)” gives the actual number of seats assigned by the Commission after rounding up. 

 

We follow exactly the same logic to calculate the number of seats that would accrue to each of these States if we were to use the population figures of the Census 2011. These calculated figures are given in Table 3 under column “2011”. Then, we round up the calculated numbers for 2011 and give the estimated number of seats for each of the 20 States as a result of fresh delimitation. In the last column, we tabulate the change in the number of seats that each State would face in the case of fresh delimitation on the basis of the population of 2011 compared to the seats it currently holds. To put the issues in a longer-term perspective, we also give in Table 3 the number of seats that would have accrued to each of the 20 States if we were to use the same methodology for the population of 1901 or 1951.

 

The “Actual (1971)” column of the Table includes the 2 seats allocated to J&K in addition its population-based entitlement of 4 and the one seat allocated to Himachal Pradesh in addition to its entitlement of 3. 

Allocations among the newly created States

 

In 1976, when the allocations were made, Uttar Pradesh and Uttarakhand were together and the calculated share of the undivided Uttar Pradesh was 84.61, rounded to 85. When Uttarakhand was carved out in 2000, it was decided to allocated 5 seats to Uttarakhand, by deciding the decimal fraction in favour of the smaller hill State. 

 

 

Similarly, when Jharkhand was carved out of Bihar 14 seats out of the 54 of undivided Bihar were allocated to it. As the Table shows, this was according to their population. Chhattisgarh, which was carved out from Madhya Pradesh in 2000, was allocated 11 of the 40 seats of undivided State, exactly according to its population share. 

 

Telangana was carved out in 2011, therefore the Census of 2011 could not recalculate the population of Telangana and Andhra separately for the earlier Censuses. Therefore, everywhere in this note, we give figures for Andhra Pradesh and Telangana together. The reorganization act allocated 17 seats to Telangana and 25 to Andhra Pradesh out of the 42 allocated to the undivided State.

 

When Sikkim was merged with India in 1975, it was statutorily allotted 1 seat in the Lok Sabha. This brought the total number of seats in the Lok Sabha to 543 from the 542 that the Delimitation Commission of 1976 had allocated.

 

The Actual (1971) column in Table 3 reflects these decisions about the allocation of seats to the newly created States.

 

Shifting the population basis to 2011: Abstract of Changes

 

In Table 4, we round up the numbers in Table 3 and list the gains and losses of different States if the population-based methodology of the Delimitation Commission of 1976 were to be applied to the earlier and later times. This puts the expected changes in a long-term perspective.

 

The Table shows that when we change the basis of calculation from the population figures of Census 1971 to Census 2011, it results in 24 seats changing between the 20 major States. 

 

The States that lose seats are the four southern States of Tamil Nadu (-7), Kerala (-5), Andhra Pradesh (-5) and Karnataka (-1); two eastern States of Odisha (-3) and West Bengal (-2); and, Punjab (-1) in the northwest. 

 

The States that gain are the heartland States of Uttar Pradesh (+7), Bihar (+6), Rajasthan (+5) and Madhya Pradesh (+3); Haryana (+1) in the northwest and Maharashtra (+1) in the southwest.

 

The States that retain the same number of Seats are also spread across diverse geographies. These include Assam in the northeast; Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh in central India and Gujarat in the west. In addition, the hill States of Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh are likely to retain their seats unchanged. But in their case, allocation is not on the basis of population alone.

 

Below, we describe the experience of these three set of States in the long term perspective presented in Table 4, where we have compared how the current number of seats get allocated between different States on the basis of population figures of 1901, 1951, 1971 and 2011.

 

 

States likely to lose in fresh delimitation

 

Tamil Nadu

As we have noted above, if we were to delimit seats today based on the population of 2011 instead of 1976, Tamil Nadu would lose 7 seats. But in the delimitation of 1976, it had already lost 5 seats compared to its population-based share of 1951. Between 1951 and 2011, the State thus would have lost 12 seats because of lower growth of its population as compared to other States. In the pre-Independence period of 1901 to 1951, it would have gained 2 seats.

 

Kerala

Kerala will lose 5 seats on fresh delimitation. Unlike Tamil Nadu, the number of seats allocated to it in 1976 would have been the same on the basis of its population of 1951 also. In the pre-Independence period from 1901 to 1951, it would have gained 2 seats, if the same methodology were followed for sharing the same number of seats as in 1976.

 

Andhra Pradesh

Andhra Pradesh (including Telangana) will lose 5 seats on fresh delimitation. It had already lost 3 seats in the delimitation of 1976 compared to its population-based share in 1951. The State would have thus lost 8 seats between 1951 and 2011, because of the lower growth of its population as compared to other States. In the pre-Independence period from 1901 to 1951, when its population was rising, it would have gained 6 seats.

 

Karnataka

Karnataka will lose one seat on fresh delimitation based on the population of 2011. It would have obtained the same 28 seats in 1901, 1951 and 1971 on the basis of the methodology adopted by the Delimitation Commission of 1976.

 

Odisha

Odisha will lose 3 seats on fresh delimitation. However, its share in the delimitation of 1976 had remained unchanged. It would have got the same 21 seats on the basis of its population of 1951 or 1971. On the basis of 1901, it would have 22 seats. The likely loss of Odisha is thus entirely because of the slower growth of its population after 1971.

 

West Bengal

West Bengal will lose two seats in a fresh delimitation. If the delimitation were done on the basis of 1951, it would have got only 38 seats, instead of 42 it got on the basis of 1971. It would have got 37 seats on the basis of its population in 1901. The last delimitation happened at a point of time, when the share of the population of the State was the highest since 1901. 

 

Punjab

Punjab will lose one seat in a fresh delimitation. If the delimitation were done on the basis of the population of 1951, it would have gotten the same 13 seats, and if the basis were shifted to 1901, it would have gotten 16. Punjab, like many States of the Ganga plains, lost heavily in its share of the population during the British rule. It was largely because the British concentrated on creating new irrigation facilities and improving agriculture in the western part of Pakistan, which went to Pakistan. In that period, many Sikhs migrated to that part of Punjab.

 

 

States likely to gain in fresh delimitation

 

Uttar Pradesh

On fresh limitation on the basis of 2011 data, Uttar Pradesh will gain 7 seats to reach 87. For the State, delimitation based on 1971 data created an anomaly. If the earlier delimitation had been done on the basis of the population of 1951, it would have got the same 87 seats that it may get now. If the same calculation were done on the basis of 1901 population-data, it would have got as many as 102 seats. This is because, as we have seen, the State suffered particularly badly during the British period. For Uttar Pradesh, a fresh delimitation would correct a wrong that happened because the last delimitation was done at a point of demographic transition when the share of the State in the population of India was at the lowest.

 

Bihar

Bihar, on fresh delimitation, will gain 6 seats to reach 46 in the Lok Sabha, making it the second highest gainer after Uttar Pradesh. It would have gotten 42 seats if the delimitation had been done on the basis of the population of 1951 and 46 if the basis for shifted to 1901. Thus delimitation on the basis of 2011 shall fully compensate for the loss in share of population that Bihar, along with Uttar Pradesh, suffered during the British period. Given current trends that indicate Bihar being two or three decades behind the country on the demographic transition curve, it will gain even more if the delimitation were to be done on the basis of Census 2027.

 

Rajasthan

On delimitation based on the 2011 Census, Rajasthan shall gain 5 seats to reach 30 seats in the current strength of the Lok Sabha, making it the third largest gainer after Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. It would have got 23 seats if the delimitation were done on the basis of Census of 1951 and 22 on the basis of 1901, showing a continuous gain since the beginning of the Census period. It shall gain even more than 5 seats, if the delimitation is done on the basis of the ongoing 2027 Census. In a succeeding note, we see that the growth rate of even Rajasthan has begun to moderate and it is likely to complete its growth phase in another three or four decades.

 

Madhya Pradesh

Madhya Pradesh shall gain 3 seats reaching a total of 32 seats in the Lok Sabha. Its share would have been 27 seats if the delimitation were done on the basis of the 1951 Census and slightly higher at 28 on the basis on 1901 Census. It shall gain even more if the data of Census 2027 is used. In a succeeding note, we see that the growth rate of this state also has begun to moderate.

 

Haryana

Haryana, unlike Punjab, shall gain one seat to reach 11 seats. It had gained two seats when the basis of delimitation was shifted from 1951 to 1971. Between 1901 and 1951, it had lost 2 seats. It may gain further if the delimitation is done on the basis of the ongoing Census 2027.

 

Maharashtra

Maharashtra shall gain 2 seats, taking the number of seats allocated to the State to 49. In this process of following the methodology of the 1971 Census for earlier and later Censuses, we notice that the share of Maharashtra has been continuously rising from 42 in 1901, to 46 in 1951, 48 in 1971 and 49 in 2011. The trends of population growth, that we discuss in a subsequent note and which are reflected in Table 1 above, indicate that Maharashtra shall probably lose when the delimitation is done on the basis of Census 2027.

 

Jammu & Kashmir

In the last delimitation, J&K was assigned 2 seats in addition to what it got on the basis of population. If this addition is continued, it shall gain one extra seat if the delimitation is done on the basis of Census 2011. In the last delimitation, it had lost one seat compared to what it would have got on the basis of Census 1951 or 1901. It may gain another seat if the delimitation is done on the basis of the next Census. As we see in a later note, its growth is now moderating.

 

 

States likely to retain the same number of Seats on fresh delimitation 

 

Himachal Pradesh

In calculating the number of seats for Uttarakhand, we have assigned it one seat in addition to its share of 3 based on the population, as was done by the Delimitation Commission of 1976. On that basis, it barely retains its 4 seats in the Lok Sabha. From the population trends, that we discuss in a subsequent note, it seems certain to lose if the delimitation is done on the basis of the next Census.

 

Uttarakhand

In calculating the number of seats for this State, we have added the fractional seat to this State rather than assigning it to Uttar Pradesh, as was done by the Delimitation Commission of 1976. With this, the State continues to retain the same number of seats on the basis of Census 2011, as were assigned to it on the basis of Census 1971. This number remains the same for Census 1951 and 1901. It is unlikely to gain in any fresh delimitation based on Census 2027 also.

 

Assam

Assam just barely retains its 14 seats in the Lok Sabha on the basis of its population in 2011. The population trends indicate that it shall certainly lose in any fresh delimitation based on a future Census. In the delimitation of 1976, however, it had gained 3 seats compared to its share in 1951. The growth of the share of Assam that began in the pre-Independence period seems to have stabilized by 1971 or thereabouts.

 

Jharkhand

Jharkhand retains the same 14 seats that it got in 1976, if we calculate on the basis of Census 2011. But this is largely because of fortuitous rounding effects. On the basis of population, it has actually gained 0.8 fraction of a seat (Table 3). It shall certainly gain if the delimitation is done on the basis of the ongoing Census of 2027. Like for Bihar, it shall take another three or four decades for the share of Jharkhand to stabilize.

 

Chhattisgarh

Chhattisgarh retains its 11 seats if we calculate on the basis of Census 2011. That number remains unchanged, if we calculate on the basis of Census 1951 also. We have noticed that Chhattisgarh has seen a spurt in population during 2001-2011. The currently ongoing Census shall tell us whether such spurt persists.

 

Gujarat

Gujarat retains its 26 seats. But, like Jharkhand, this is because of fortuitous rounding effects. On the basis of population, it has actually gained 0.9 fraction of a seat (Table 3). The State is likely to gain in fresh delimitation based on the ongoing Census. In the delimitation of 1976, it had gained 2 seats as compared to its share in 1951 and 6 seats compared to its share in 1901. Gujarat has been gaining in share continuously since 1901. In our subsequent note, we see that Gujarat remains somewhat behind other States on the demographic transition curve.

 

 

Conclusion:

The analysis above brings out the following conclusions:

 

1. The share of different States in the total population of India has been changing since 1901. The pace and trend of change has been different for different States. The share of some States was rising in the earlier part of this period, the share of others began to rise in the later part.

 

2. The trends indicate that the States of India, like all of India together, have been passing through a demographic transition in this period. For some, the rise in population— that is generally a consequence of improvements in nutrition, health, hygiene and sanitation, etc. — began early. They were growing already in the British period. Many of those early beginners have passed through various stages of demographic transition, have completed the process and have entered the stage of stable or declining population. Others started late and are still at the stage of rising population. 

 

3. Delimitation on the basis of population of a particular Census in this scenario means altering representation when the relative population of different States is changing sharply from decade to decade. Many of the States that would gain now if the delimitation is done on the basis of 2011 population may have lost when the delimitation was done on the basis of 1971 population. Others may have gained in the last delimitation and may gain again now. Still others, may have lost then and may lose again. It depends entirely on what stage of the demographic curve a State is lying at the particular point of time when the delimitation is undertaken.

 

4. We have described these changes for different States at several points of time. The pattern of changes shows that the process seems fundamentally arbitrary. That arbitrariness arises from trying to change representation when different States are still going through their separate processes of demographic transition.

 

5. As a consequence of the different stages of demographic transition in which different States happen to be today, a fresh delimitation would lead to four of the southern States, Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh (including Telangana), Kerala and Karnataka losing substantial number of seats as compared to their current allocation. So shall Odisha, West Bengal and Punjab. Tamil Nadu is likely to lose as many as 7 seats and Kerala and Andhra Pradesh will lose 5 each. This is because these States have already completed their demographic transition, while others are several decades behind on that curve. 

 

6. The data shows that all of the States of India, even the most laggard ones, are likely to reach the final stage of the transition within the next 3 to 4 decades. That will be a better time to undertake a reallocation of the seats in the Lok Sabha according to the stable or near stable population of different States.

 

7. In a subsequent note, we shall graphically show the ongoing process of demographic transition for different States. Those graphs show that all of the States are already reaching near the final stage of the transition.

 

8. The polity of India in the past has displayed the maturity and wisdom to not disturb relative representation of different States when the country is passing through a demographic transition. We have retained an embargo on such alterations for fifty years. Let us continue with that wise restrain for another three or four decades and await the completion of the transition in all States.

 

Documents of our Times: Remarks of Marco Rubio February 2026

The USA declares a new resolve to Recolonise the World

 

Below we give a transcript of the remarks delivered by Marco Rubio, Secretary of State of the USA, at the Munich Security Conference. In these remarks, Rubio attempts the following:

 

1.              He reclaims the European heritage for himself and for the USA. He goes to the extent of tracing his own far ancestry to the Italian island of Sardinia and to Seville in Spain and asserts that the USA may be just 250 years old but it is part of and perhaps the inheritor of the long civilisational history of the West.

2.              He celebrates the long ages of Western dominance and colonisation of the world and regrets the passing of that sad phase of human history: “For five centuries before the end of the Second World War, the West had been expanding. Its missionaries, its pilgrims, its soldiers, its explorers, pouring out from its shores to cross oceans, settle new continents, build vast empires extending out across the globe. But in 1945, for the first time since the age of Columbus, it was contracting.”

3.              He asserts the resolve of the United States to establish again the “West’s age of dominance”, preferably with Europe as a partner, but alone if necessary: “Under President Trump, the United States of America will once again take on the task of renewal and restoration, driven by a vision of a future as proud, as sovereign, and as vital as our civilization’s past. And while we are prepared, if necessary, to do this alone, it is our preference and it is our hope to do this together with you, our friends here in Europe.”

4.              This fourth point is curious. He tangentially asserts that India is on board with this project of recolonizing the world. In the question-answer part, he gratuitously brings in India: “In the meantime, everything else continues to happen. …In our conversations with India, we’ve gotten their commitment to stop buying additional Russian oil. …”

 

India seems to be a necessary part of this project of reasserting Western dominance in the modern world. India’s 1.4 billion people are crucial to this enterprise, as Netanyahu often mentions. But India shall be the junior partner. It shall never be allowed to rise like another China, as Christopher Landau, Deputy Secretary of State, has so blatantly said recently on the Indian soil.

 

Let us remember that India was also crucial to the earlier colonization project of the West. India was the “crown jewel” of the British Empire. Even then, like now, many Indian leaders used to express their deep feelings of brotherhood with the West. Now even Bibi thinks, he and the Prime Minister of India are not merely friends, but “brothers”. Is history poised to repeat itself? Putting us Indians, once again, in the position of willing subservience to the West from which the Mahatma had forcefully lifted us out.

 

We hope to discuss different aspects of India’s role in the projected new world order in subsequent articles. Here, we present the complete transcript of Marco Rubio’s remarks that appear to formally inaugurate the new project of western dominance.

 

 

Transcript: Marco Rubio Remarks at Munich Security Conference 2026, February 14, 2026 

 

A Historic Alliance That Saved the World 

 

MARCO RUBIO: Thank you very much. We gather here today as members of a historic alliance, an alliance that saved and changed the world. You know, when this conference began in 1963, it was in a nation, actually it was on a continent, that was divided against itself. The line between communism and freedom ran through the heart of Germany. The first barbed fences of the Berlin Wall had gone up just two years prior. And just months before that first conference, before our predecessors first met here, here in Munich, the Cuban Missile Crisis had brought the world to the brink of nuclear destruction. 

 

Even as World War II still burned fresh in the memory of Americans and Europeans alike, we found ourselves staring down the barrel of a new global catastrophe, one with the potential for a new kind of destruction, more apocalyptic and final than anything before in the history of mankind. The time of that first gathering, Soviet communism was on the march. Thousands of years of Western civilization hung in the balance. At that time, victory was far from certain. 

 

But we were driven by a common purpose. We were unified, not just by what we were fighting against. We were unified by what we were fighting for. And together, Europe and America prevailed. And a continent was rebuilt. Our people prospered. In time, the East and West blocs were reunited. A civilization was once again made whole. That infamous wall that had cleaved this nation into two came down, and with it an evil empire. And the East and West became one again. 

 

 

The Dangerous Delusion of the “End of History” 

 

But the euphoria of this triumph led us to a dangerous delusion. That we had entered, quote, “the end of history.” That every nation would now be a liberal democracy. That the ties formed by trade and by commerce alone would now replace nationhood. That the rules-based global order, an overused term, would now replace the national interest. And that we would now live in a world without borders where everyone became a citizen of the world. 

 

This was a foolish idea that ignored both human nature and it ignored the lessons of over 5,000 years of recorded human history. And it has cost us dearly. 

 

 

The Cost of Our Mistakes 

 

In this delusion, we embraced a dogmatic vision of free and unfettered trade, even as some nations protected their economies and subsidized their companies, to systematically undercut ours, shuttering our plants, resulting in large parts of our societies being de-industrialized, shipping millions of working and middle-class jobs overseas, and handing control of our critical supply chains to both adversaries and rivals. 

 

We increasingly outsourced our sovereignty to international institutions while many nations invested in massive welfare states at the cost of maintaining the ability to defend themselves. This, even as other countries have invested in the most rapid military build-up in all of human history and have not hesitated to use hard power to pursue their own interests. 

 

To appease a climate cult, we have imposed energy policies on ourselves that are impoverishing our people, even as our competitors exploit oil and coal and natural gas and anything else not just to power their economies, but to use as leverage against our own. And in a pursuit of a world without borders, we opened our doors to an unprecedented wave of mass migration that threatens the cohesion of our societies, the continuity of our culture, and the future of our people. 

 

 

A Vision of Renewal and Restoration 

 

We made these mistakes together, and now together we owe it to our people to face those facts and to move forward to rebuild. Under President Trump, the United States of America will once again take on the task of renewal and restoration, driven by a vision of a future as proud, as sovereign, and as vital as our civilization’s past. And while we are prepared, if necessary, to do this alone, it is our preference and it is our hope to do this together with you, our friends here in Europe. For the United States and Europe, we belong together.

 

America was founded 250 years ago, but the roots began here on this continent long before. The men who settled and built the nation of my birth arrived on our shores carrying the memories and the traditions and the Christian faith of their ancestors as a sacred inheritance, an unbreakable link between the old world and the new.

 

We are part of one civilization, Western civilization. We are bound to one another by the deepest bonds that nations could share, forged by centuries of shared history, Christian faith, culture, heritage, language, ancestry, and the sacrifices our forefathers made together for the common civilization to which we have fallen heir.

 

 

A Call for Seriousness and Reciprocity 

 

And so, this is why we Americans may sometimes come off as a little direct and urgent in our counsel. This is why President Trump demands seriousness and reciprocity from our friends here in Europe. The reason why, my friends, is because we care deeply. We care deeply about your future and ours. 

 

And if at times we disagree, our disagreements come from our profound sense of concern about a Europe with which we are connected, not just economically, not just militarily. We are connected spiritually and we are connected culturally. We want Europe to be strong. We believe that Europe must survive. 

 

Because the two great wars of the last century serve for us as history’s constant reminder that ultimately our destiny is, and will always be, intertwined with yours. Because we know that the fate of Europe will never be irrelevant to our own. 

 

 

What Are We Defending? 

 

National security, which this conference is largely about, is not merely a series of technical questions. How much we spend on defence or where, how we deploy it, these are important questions. They are. But they are not the fundamental one. 

 

The fundamental question we must answer at the outset is what exactly are we defending? Because armies do not fight for abstractions. Armies fight for a people. Armies fight for a nation. Armies fight for a way of life. 

 

And that is what we are defending. A great civilization that has every reason to be proud of its history, confident of its future, and aims to always be the master of its own economic and political destiny. 

 

 

Europe’s Legacy and Promise 

 

It was here, in Europe, where the ideas that planted the seeds of liberty that changed the world were born. It was here, in Europe, where the world, which gave the world the rule of law, the universities, and the scientific revolution.

 

It was this continent that produced the genius of Mozart and Beethoven, of Dante and Shakespeare, of Michelangelo and da Vinci, of the Beatles and the Rolling Stones. And this is the place where the vaulted ceilings of the Sistine Chapel and the towering spires of the great cathedral in Cologne, they testify not just to the greatness of our past or to a faith in God that inspired these marvels. They foreshadow the wonders that await us in our future.

 

But only if we are unapologetic in our heritage and proud of this common inheritance can we together begin the work of envisioning and shaping our economic and our political future. 

 

 

Reversing Destructive Policy Choices 

 

Deindustrialization was not inevitable. It was a conscious policy choice, a decades-long economic undertaking that stripped our nations of their wealth, of their productive capacity, and of their independence. 

 

And the loss of our supply chain sovereignty was not a function of a prosperous and healthy system of global trade. It was foolish. It was a foolish but voluntary transformation of our economy that left us dependent on others for our needs and dangerously vulnerable to crisis. 

 

Mass migration is not, was not, is some fringe concern of little consequence. It was and continues to be a crisis which is transforming and destabilizing societies all across the West. 

 

Together we can re-industrialize our economies and rebuild our capacity to defend our people. But the work of this new alliance should not be focused just on military cooperation and reclaiming the industries of the past. It should also be focused on together advancing our mutual interests and new frontiers, unshackling our ingenuity, our creativity, and the dynamic spirit to build a new Western century. 

 

Commercial space travel and cutting-edge artificial intelligence, industrial automation and flex manufacturing, creating a Western supply chain for critical minerals not vulnerable to extortion from other powers, and a unified effort to compete for market share in the economies of the global South. Together we can not only take back control of our own industries and supply chains, we can prosper in the areas that will define the 21st century. 

 

 

Border Control and National Sovereignty 

 

But we must also gain control of our national borders. Controlling who and how many people enter our countries, this is not an expression of xenophobia, it is not hate, it is a fundamental act of national sovereignty. And the failure to do so is not just an abdication of one of our most basic duties owed to our people. It is an urgent threat to the fabric of our societies and the survival of our civilization itself.

 

 

Reforming the Global Order 

 

And finally, we can no longer place the so-called global order above the vital interests of our people and our nations. We do not need to abandon the system of international cooperation we authored, and we don’t need to dismantle the global institutions of the old order that together we built. But these must be reformed. These must be rebuilt. 

 

For example, the United Nations still has tremendous potential to be a tool for good in the world, but we cannot ignore that today on the most pressing matters before us, it has no answers and has played virtually no role. It could not solve the war in Gaza, instead it was American leadership that freed captives from barbarians and brought about a fragile truce. It has not solved the war in Ukraine. It took American leadership in partnership with many of the countries here today just to bring the two sides to the table in search of a still elusive peace. It was powerless to constrain the nuclear program of radical Shia clerics in Tehran. That required 14 bombs dropped with precision from American B-2 bombers. And it was unable to address the threat to our security from a narco-terrorist dictator in Venezuela. Instead, it took American special forces to bring this fugitive to justice. 

 

In a perfect world, all of these problems and more would be solved by diplomats and strongly worded resolutions, but we do not live in a perfect world, and we cannot continue to allow those who blatantly and openly threaten our citizens and endanger our global stability to shield themselves behind abstractions of international law which they themselves routinely violate. 

 

 

Walking Together on a Shared Path 

 

This is the path that President Trump and the United States has embarked upon. It is the path we ask you here in Europe to join us on. It is a path we have walked together before and hope to walk together again. 

 

For five centuries before the end of the Second World War, the West had been expanding. Its missionaries, its pilgrims, its soldiers, its explorers, pouring out from its shores to cross oceans, settle new continents, build vast empires extending out across the globe. But in 1945, for the first time since the age of Columbus, it was contracting. Europe was in ruins. Half of it lived behind an iron curtain and the rest looked like it would soon follow. The great Western empires had entered into terminal decline, accelerated by godless communist revolutions and by anti-colonial uprisings that would transform the world and drape the red hammer and sickle across vast swaths of the map in the years to come. 

 

Against that backdrop, then as now, many came to believe that the West’s age of dominance had come to an end and that our future was destined to be a faint and feeble echo of our past. But together, our predecessors recognized that decline was a choice and it was a choice they refused to make. This is what we did together once before and this is what President Trump and the United States want to do again now, together with you. And this is why we do not want our allies to be weak. Because that makes us weaker. 

 

We want allies who can defend themselves so that no adversary will ever be tempted to test our collective strength. This is why we do not want our allies to be shackled by guilt and shame. We want allies who are proud of their culture and of their heritage, who understand that we are heirs to the same great and noble civilization, and who, together with us, are willing and able to defend it.

 

And this is why we do not want allies to rationalize the broken status quo, rather than reckon with what is necessary to fix it. For we in America have no interest in being polite and orderly caretakers of the West’s managed decline. We do not seek to separate, but to revitalize an old friendship and renew the greatest civilization in human history.

 

What we want is a reinvigorated alliance that recognizes that what has ailed our societies is not just a set of bad policies, but a malaise of hopelessness and complacency. An alliance that we want is one that is not paralyzed into inaction by fear. Fear of climate change, fear of war, fear of technology. Instead, we want an alliance that boldly races into the future. And the only fear we have is the fear of the shame of not leaving our nations prouder, stronger, and wealthier for our children. 

 

An alliance ready to defend our people, to safeguard our interests, and to preserve the freedom of action that allows us to shape our own destiny, not one that exists to operate a global welfare state and atone for the purported sins of past generations. An alliance that does not allow its power to be outsourced, constrained, or subordinated to systems beyond its control. One that does not depend on others for the critical necessities of its national life. And one that does not maintain the polite pretence that our way of life is just one among many, and that asks for permission before it acts. 

 

And above all, an alliance based on the recognition that we, the West, have inherited together, what we have inherited together is something that is unique, and distinctive, and irreplaceable. Because this, after all, is the very foundation of the transatlantic bond. 

 

Acting together in this way, we will not just help recover a sane foreign policy. It will restore to us a clear sense of ourselves. It will restore a place in the world. And in so doing, it will rebuke and deter the forces of civilizational erasure that today menace both America and Europe alike. 

 

 

America’s European Heritage 

 

So, in a time of headlines, heralding the end of the transatlantic era, let it be known and clear to all that this is neither our goal nor our wish. Because for us Americans, our home may be in the Western Hemisphere, but we will always be a child of Europe. 

 

Our story began with an Italian explorer whose adventure into the great unknown to discover a new world brought Christianity to the Americas and became the legend that defined the imagination of our pioneer nation. Our first colonies were built by English settlers, to whom we owe not just the language we speak, but the whole of our political and legal system. 

 

Our frontiers were shaped by Scots-Irish, that proud, hardy clan from the hills of Ulster that gave us Davy Crockett, and Mark Twain, and Teddy Roosevelt, and Neil Armstrong. Our great Midwestern heartland was built by German farmers and craftsmen who transformed empty plains into a global agricultural powerhouse. And by the way, dramatically upgraded the quality of American beer. 

 

Our expansion into the interior followed the footsteps of French fur traders and explorers whose names, by the way, still adorn the street signs and town names all across the Mississippi Valley. Our horses, our ranches, our rodeos, the entire romance of the cowboy archetype that became synonymous with the American West. These were born in Spain, and our largest and most iconic city was named New Amsterdam before it was named New York. 

 

And you know that in the year that my country was founded, Lorenzo and Catalina Giroldi lived in Casale Monferrato in the kingdom of Piedmont, Sardinia, and Jose and Manuela Reyna lived in Sevilla, Spain. I don’t know what, if anything, they knew about the 13 colonies which had gained their independence from the British Empire, but here’s what I’m certain of. They could have never imagined that 250 years later, one of their direct descendants would be back here today on this continent as the chief diplomat of that infant nation. 

 

And yet here I am, reminded by my own story that both our histories and our fates will always be linked. Together we rebuilt a shattered continent in the wake of two devastating world wars. When we found ourselves divided once again by the Iron Curtain, the Free West linked arms with the courageous dissidents struggling against tyranny in the East to defeat Soviet Communism. We have fought against each other, then reconciled, then fought, then reconciled again. And we have bled and died side by side on battlefields from Kapyong to Kandahar. 

 

And I’m here today to leave it clear that America is charting the path for a new century of prosperity and that once again we want to do it together with you, our cherished allies, and our oldest friends. We want to do it together with you, with a Europe that is proud of its heritage and of its history, with a Europe that has the spirit of creation and liberty that sent ships out into uncharted seas and birthed our civilization, with a Europe that has the means to defend itself and the will to survive. 

 

We should be proud of what we achieved together in the last century, but now we must confront and embrace the opportunities of a new one. Because yesterday is over, the future is inevitable, and our destiny together awaits. Thank you. 

 

 

Q&A Session Begins 

 

INTERVIEWER: Mr. Secretary, I’m not sure you heard the sigh of relief through this hall when we were just listening to what I would interpret as a message of reassurance, of partnership. You spoke of intertwined relations between the United States and Europe. It reminds me of statements made decades ago by your predecessors when the discussion was, is actually America a European power? Is America a power in Europe? 

 

Thank you for offering this message of reassurance about our partnership. This is actually not the first time that Marco Rubio is here at the Munich Security Conference. He’s been here before a couple of times, but it’s the first time he has been and he is the speaker as Secretary of State. So, thank you again. 

 

We have only a couple of minutes now for just a few questions, and if I may, we collected questions from the audience. One of the key issues here yesterday, today, is of course, continues to be the question of how to deal with the war in Ukraine. Many of us in the discussions of the last day, the last 24 hours, have voiced their impression that the Russians, let me put it colloquially, the Russians are playing for time. They’re not really interested in a meaningful settlement. There’s no indication that they’re willing to compromise on any of their maximalist objectives. Offer to us, if you could, your assessment of where we are and where you think we can go. 

 

 

Assessment on Ukraine-Russia Negotiations 

 

MARCO RUBIO: Well, I think where we are at this point is that the issues at play that have to be… here’s the good news. The good news is that the issues that need to be confronted to end this war have been narrowed. That’s the good news. The bad news is they’ve been narrowed to the hardest questions to answer, and work remains to be done in that front. 

 

I hear your point, but the answer is we don’t know. We don’t know if the Russians are serious about ending the war. They say they are, and under what terms they are willing to do it, and whether we can find terms that are acceptable to Ukraine that Russia will always agree to, but we’re going to continue to test it. 

 

In the meantime, everything else continues to happen. The United States has imposed additional sanctions on Russia’s oil. In our conversations with India, we’ve gotten their commitment to stop buying additional Russian oil. Europe has taken its set of steps moving forward. The Pearl Program continues in which American weaponry is being sold for the Ukrainian war effort. So, all these things continue. Nothing has stopped in the interim, so there’s no buying of time here in that regard. 

What we can’t answer, but we’re going to continue to test, is whether there is an outcome that Ukraine can live with and that Russia will accept. And I would say it’s been elusive up to this point. We’ve made progress in the sense that for the first time, I think, in years, at least at the technical level, there were military officials from both sides that met together last week, and there will be meetings again on Tuesday, although it may not be the same group of people. 

 

Look, we’re going to continue to do everything we can to play this role of bringing this war to an end. I don’t think anybody in this room would be against a negotiated settlement to this war, so long as the conditions are just and sustainable. And that’s what we aim to achieve, and we’re going to continue to try to achieve it, even as all these other things continue to happen on the sanctions front and so forth. 

 

 

INTERVIEWER: Thank you very much. I’m sure if we had more time, there would be many questions on Ukraine. But let me conclude by asking a question about something entirely different. The next speaker here in just a couple of minutes will be the foreign minister of China. When you served in the Senate, sir, people considered you kind of a China hawk. 

 

MARCO RUBIO: So did they. 

 

INTERVIEWER: So did they. We know that there will be, in about two months’ time, a summit meeting between President Trump and President Xi Jinping. Give us your expectation. Are you optimistic? 

 

Can there be a quote-unquote deal with China? What do you expect? 

 

 

Managing U.S.-China Relations 

 

MARCO RUBIO: Well, I would say this. The two largest economies in the world, two of the big powers on the planet, we have an obligation to communicate with them and talk. And so do many of you on a bilateral basis as well. I mean, it would be geopolitical malpractice to not be in conversations with China. 

 

I would say this. Because we’re two large countries with huge global interests, our national interests will often not align. Their national interests and ours will not align. And we owe it to the world to try to manage those as best we can, obviously avoiding conflict, both economic and worse. And so, it’s important for us to have communications with them in that regard. 

 

On areas in which our interests are aligned, I think we can work together to make positive impact on the world. And we seek opportunities to do that with them. But we have to have a relationship with China. And many of the countries represented here today are going to have to have a relationship with China, always understanding that nothing that we agree to could come at the expense of our national interests. 

 

And, frankly, we expect China to act in their national interests as we expect every nation state to act in their national interests. And the goal of diplomacy is to try to navigate those times in which our national interests come into conflict with one another, always hoping to do it peacefully. 

 

I think we also have a special obligation because whatever happens between the U.S. and China on trade has a global implication. So, there are long-term challenges that we face that we’re going to have to confront that are going to be irritants in our relationship with China. That’s not just true for the United States. That’s true for the broader West. But I do think we need to try to manage those the best we can to avoid, you know, unnecessary friction if it’s possible. But no one is under any illusions. 

 

There are some fundamental challenges between our countries and between the West and China that will continue for the foreseeable future for a variety of reasons. And it’s some of the things we hope to work together with you on. 

 

INTERVIEWER: Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. We’ve run out of time. I’m sorry that I can’t take questions from all those who wanted to ask questions. Mr. Secretary of State, thank you for this message of reassurance. I think this is much appreciated here in the hall. Let’s offer a round of applause. Thank you.